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Summary  findings
The experience of countries in transition from a planned  They find that intial conditions and economic policy
to a market-oriented economy has varied greatly. The  jointly determine the large differences in economic
clearest differences are between the East Asian countries,  performance among the 28 transition  economies in the
China and Vietnam, and the countries of Central and  sample. Initiate conditions dominate in explaining
Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union  inflation, but economic liberalization is the most
(FSU). China and Vietnam have contained inflation and  important  factor determining differences in growth. But
benefited from continued high growth in GDP since the  reform policy choices are not exogenous. They depend,
beginning of their reforms, while all CEE and FSU  in turn, on both initial conditions and political reform,
countries have experienced  large declines in output, and  with political reform the most important determinant of
most have experienced  hyperinflation.  the speed and comprehensiveness of economic
But even in CEE and the FSU, differences are marked.  liberalization.
Some countries have lost over half of their GDP, and  Other findings provide additional insight into these
growth performance in a number of countries is still  relationships. Results show that  iiberalization has a
poor, while others are growing strongly. Some are still  negative contemporaneous  impact, but a stronger
suffering from high inflation while others have  positive effect on performance over time. The results also
successfully reduced annual inflation.  show that macroeconomic and structural distortions are
What determines this divergence of outcomes across  negatively related to both policy and performance.
transition countries? No study so far has analyzed the  Regarding the former, unfavorable initial conditions
interaction of all factors, including initial conditions,  discourage policy reforms but do not diminish their
political change, and reforms, in a unified framework  effectiveness once they are implemented. The authors
including CEE, the FSU, China, and Vietnam. De Melo,  find some evidence that the influence of initial
Denizer, Gelb, and Tenev examine these broader  conditions diminishes over time. This is in part because
interactions, but focus first on the role of initial  many of the initial conditions are themselves modified in
conditions, such as initial macroeconomic distortions and  the course of transition.  Monetary overhangs are
differences in economic structure and institutions, which  dissipated through inflation, industrial overhang is
have been emphasized less in the literature.  eroded as plants shut down, and market memory returns
through experience.
This paper - a product  of the Development  Research Group  - is part of a  larger effort in the group  to provide a
comparative overview of the experience with the transition from central planning to a market economy. Copies of the paper
are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact Cynthia Bernardo,
room MC2-501,  telephone 202-473-1148,  fax 202-522-1154,  Internet  address cbernardo@aworldbank.org. December
1997. (54 pages)
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The experience of countries in transition from a planned to a market oriented economy has
varied  greatly.  The clearest  differences  are between the East Asian  countries, China  and Vietnam, and the
countries of the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union (FSU).  China and
Vietnam  have contained  inflation  and benefited  from continued  high growth in GDP since  the beginning
oftheir reforms,  while  all  CEE and FSU countries  have experienced  large output declines,  and most have
experienced  hyperinflation.  But even in CEE and FSU, differences  are marked.  Some countries have
lost over half of their GDP and growth performance  in a number of countries is still  poor, while  others
are  growing  strongly. Some are still suffering  from high inflation  while  others have successfully  reduced
annual inflation  to 50 percent or less. What are the main determinants  of this divergence  of outcomes
across transition  economies?
The literature on transition emphasizes the importance  of different  factors in different  country
groups. Many observers have, for example, noted that the inherited economic conditions, natural
resources, histories,  and institutions  of transition  countries  were very different  between CEE and FSU.'
Drawing attention to these differences,  they point out that the transition path of a given country  will
depend  both on its initial  conditions  and on the economic  policies  it chooses to implement.  The empirical
analysis, however, has largely focused on the effects of policies 2. Several  recent studies have
1See  for example  Fisher  and  Gelb  (1991),  Bruno  (I992, 1993)
2  A number  of papers,  Balcerowicz  and  Gelb  (1996),  de Melo,  Denizer  and  Gelb (1996a),  and  Fischer,  Sahay
and Vegh  (I 996a,b)  and  Denizer  (1997)  do include  one  or two  initial  conditions  in  their analysis.  However,  these
studies ignore  other  initial  conditions  and  therefore  may  have  failed  to capture  some  important  dimensions  of the
transition  process.
2emphasized the variability  in policies and performance  and have shown that government policies were
key determinants  of cross-country  variation  in growth and inflation 3. The analysis  show that economies
in CEE and FSU contracted strongly  as major reforms were initiated  but mostly  resumed  growth about
two years later, after achieving  price stability. The analysis  also shows that delaying  reforms does not
prevent  output  declines,  and success  in controlling  inflation  has been positively  related to reforms. These
results  suggest that the issue is not  so much big-bang versus gradualism but  one  of achieving
macroeconomic  stability  and quickly  shifting  factors of production  to the most efficient  use.
These findings  have in turn focused attention on the determinants  of policy choices in CEE and
FSU countries.  The emphasis  has largely  been on political  transition, with little attention being  given  to
the role of initial  conditions  as a key factor shaping  the reform process and hence economic  outcomes'.
In particular, it is noted that there have been close links between political  transition and intensity  of
reforms (Balcerowicz and Gelb 1995, Aslund 1995, De Melo, Denizer, and Gelb 1996, and Aslund,
Boone, and Johnson 1996). Economic  reforrn has been easier  in countries  where rapid and fundamental
political  change has taken place. In these countries, an initial  period of"extraordinary politics"  provided
a window of opportunity  for policy  makers to push through decisive  reforms. More recently,  Shleifer
(1997), comparing  the performance  of Russia and Poland, has pointed out the importance of political
transition in determining  the success of economic  reforms.
3 See Aslund, Boone and Johnson (1996), de Melo, Denizer and Gelb (1 996a and b), de Melo and Gelb
(1996), Fisher, Sahay and Vegh (1996a,b), Sachs (1996a), Selowski and Martin (1996), and Hremandez-Cata  (1997).
See Blanchard (1997), and Brixiova and Kiyotaki (1997) for theoretical aspects of transition.
4Ickes  (1996)  discusses some of the consequences of not including  initial conditions  in the analysis of reforms
and performance in the context of transition. In his review of the transition process, Murrell(1  996) points out that the
degree of political change and liberalization seems to be related to initial conditions and war.
3It has been  difficult,  however,  to accommodate  the experience  of China  and  Vietnam  within  the
above framework.  The gradual  reforms  in these two countries  compared  to Eastern  Europe were
broadly  consistent  with the limited  extent  of political  change 5. Their  economic  performance,  however,
followed  a pattern  very different  from  the one observed  in CEE  and the FSU.  While  there are  various
interpretations  of the Asian  experience  with transition,  a prominent  feature  of these  interpretations  has
been the attention  paid  to the role of initial  conditions 6. Initial  conditions,  and in particular  structural
characteristics  such  as surplus  agricultural  labor,  have  been often  referred  to as the primary  causes  of
growth in socialist  Asia 7. Several  studies  have  also  recognized  the role  of initial  conditions  in shaping
Asia's reform  strategy.  Thomas  and  Wang (1997),  for example,  argue  that "countries  with relatively
stable  political  and  macroeconomic  conditions  usually  feel  no particular  urgency  to reform,  so  they  can
afford  to conduct  reforms  in an evolutionary  fashion,  rather  than  risk  political  and  economic  chaos"  and
"China and  most  East Asian  countries  belong  to this  group".
But none of these studies has taken an integrated  approach  to explaining  the transition
experience. In particular,  no systematic  attempt  has been  made  so far to look at the interaction  of all
factors,  including  initial  conditions,  political  change  and  reforms,  in a unified  framework  comprising  CEE
and FSU as well  as China  and  Vietnam.  This  paper  attempts  to look at these  broader  interactions,  but
initially  focuses  on the role  of initial  conditions,  which  has  been  less  emphasized  in  the literature.
5 Vietnam went through a phase of rapid reform in 1989 in response to high inflation. In this regard, its
experience is different from that of China.
6 See for example the discussion in Sachs and Woo (1997) on the experimentalist and the convergence  schools
of thought in interpreting  the Chinese Experience.
' See Parker, S., Gavin Tritt and Wing Thye Woo. (1997) Some Lessons Learned from Comparison  of
Transitions in Asia and Eastern Europe, in Woo W., Stephen Parker and Jeffrey Sachs (1997).
4The  previous  findings  on policies  and  politics  raise  several  important  issues  related  to the role of
initial  conditions  in transition  economies.  The first  issue  is: How important  are  initial  conditions  in the
determination  of policy  choices?  Related  questions  are: Is the large  variation  in policies  mainly  due to
different  rates  of political  change,  as argued  by many,  and  does  this  mean  policy  makers  do not  take into
account  initial  conditions  of their  countries  in  formulating  reform  policies?  Are  there relevant  economic,
social, and institutional  circumstances  that act as constraints  or catalysts  to reforms? For example,
WDR 1996, notes  that  "countries'  characteristics--their  unique  advantages  and disadvantages--
influence  what  policies  can  be chosen  and  what  leaders  can  accomplish".
A second,  related  issue  is: Through  what channels  might  initial  conditions  affect  policies?  Do
they directly  influence  their effectiveness  and hence  the policies  being chosen? Murrell  (1996),  for
instance,  has observed  that  policies  may have "become  increasingly  homogeneous  overtime  but
outcomes  have  become  more  varied,  suggesting  that  initial  conditions  greatly  determine  the effectiveness
of policies".  If so, can  slow  reforms  be viewed  as a rational  response  to lower  effectiveness  of policies
under  unfavorable  initial  conditions?
A third, issue  relates  to the impact  of initial  conditions  on performance.  Assuming  there  is an
indirect  effect  on performance  through  policy  choices,  do we observe  in addition  a strong  direct  effect  of
initial conditions  on growth and inflation? If initial conditions  have an independent  effect on
performance,  how  does  this  effect  evolve  over  time  and  what  is in general  the time  profile  of the impact
of  initial  conditions  on  the  policies-performance  relationship?  Do we observe  a diminution  of  the effect  of
initial  conditions  on policies  and performance  or is this  effect  magnified  over  time?
Given  these questions,  we analyze  here  the role of initial  conditions  and  their  interaction  with
5policy  choice  and  economic  performance  dufing  the transition  period in 28 countries.  The  nature  of the
problems  addressed  in this  paper  requires  a sample  which  is consistent  with respect  to the beginning  of
transition  for different  countries.  China's  shift  to  more market-oriented  economic  policy  started  in
1978;  Vietnam's  reform  program  (doi  moi)  was launched  in 1986;  in  Eastem  Europe  and  Mongolia,  and
in the FSU, the major  events  that marked  the revolutionary  change  in political  and economic  systems
occurred  in 1989-90  and 1991  respectively.  The duration  of  transition  in  the FSU and  our preference  to
work  with a balanced  sample  constrain  the length  of  the time  series  for these  sub-groups  of countries  to
five  years.  Our main  sample  therefore  includes  observations  for the periods  1979-83  for China,  1987-91
for Vietnam,  1990-94  for Eastern  Europe  and  Mongolia,  and 1992-96  for the FSU.
In the  next  section,  we discuss  a range  of initial  conditions  as well  as some  special  factors  that  are
thought to affect  the transition  experience.  A total of 11 country-specific  factors  are considered  as
potentially  important.  Utilizing  principal  components  analysis  we derive  and  interpret  main  clusters  of
the  full  range  of initial  conditions.  Two such  clusters  are  used in subsequent  multiple  regression  analysis.
In section  III, the focus  is on whether  these  initial  conditions,  together  with  a political  change  variable,
explain the choice of reform policy.  We test for the impact of initial conditions  on policy and
performance  over  time.  We  then  use  the results  from  the regression  equations  to come  up with  estimates
of the relative  importance  of initial  conditions  and  policies  in determining  performance,  as measured  by
growth  and inflation.  In this  section  we also study  the time  profile  of output and  inflation  in transition
economies  taking  initial  conditions  and  policies  into  account. Section  IV summarizes  the main  findings
of the paper.
6Standard  caveats  on  data  problems,  which  are especially  severe  in transition  economnies,  apply  to
conclusions  drawn  here. These  problems  include  difficulties  in estimating  deflators;  difficulties  in deriving
consistent  measures  of trade and balance  of payments  over time; over-reporting  of output at the
beginning  of transition  and under-reporting  of output as transition  and private  sector development
proceed'. With  this  in mind,  conclusions  are drawn  with  modesty.
II.  INITIAL  CONDMONS,  CLUSTERS  AND  OTHER  FACTORS  AFFECTING
TRANSITION
11.1  Transition  and Initial Conditions
Despite a common legacy of planning, the transition economies started out under different
circumstances. There were  substantial differences in  terms of  the  initial level of  development,
macroeconomic  distortions,  integration  into the trading system of the socialist  countries, extent of prior
reforms  etc. In Eastem Europe, the beginning  of the transition  process was marked by a wave of largely
peaceful political  revolutions  in 1989, accompanied  by an economic  shock from the breakdown of the
CMEA  trading  arrangements.  For the FSU republics,  the collapse  of the Soviet  Union  in 1991  was the
defining  political  and  economic  event,  as a result  of which  these  countries  gained  their  independence  and
began  their  transition  to market economies. Reforms in China  and Vietnam  started earlier,  but without a
radical  polMical  change. Drawving  on the literature and our own earlier  work on transition,  we identify 11
variables,  sunaxized  in Tables 1 and 2, to characterize  the initial  conditions  of transition economies  just
8 Kaufmnan  and  Kaliberda  (1996) and  Johnson,  Kaufman,  and Shleifer  (1997)  provide  an interesting  analysis  of
the size  of unofficial  economy  in transition  economies.
7prior to their  shift  towards  market-oriented  development-1978  for China,  1986  for Vietnam,  1989  for
Eastern  Europe,  and  1989-91  for FSU  and  Mongolia.  In Table  1,  we group  indicators  for initial  levels  of
development,  resources  and growth. Table 2 presents  variables  reflecting  initial macroeconomic
distortions  and  institutional  characteristics  of the transition  economies. 9
As shown  in Table  1, transition  countries  span  a considerable  range  of development.  Income
levels  (INC), measured  in 1989  US$ but reflecting  purchasing  power  parity  incomes  in the base  year,
ranged  from $800  in China  to over  $ 9000  in Slovenia.  Per capita  income  for China  is  widely  debated
but at the start of its transition  was perhaps  half  that of Albania.  Social  indicators  roughly  followed
income  levels;  life  expectancy  ranged  between  61 and  75 years  and  infant  mortality  rates,  from 8 to 66.
Urbanization  (URBAN)  is another proxy for level of development. Its cross-country
distribution  closely  mirrors  that of income  levels,  with lower  income  countries  being  on average  more
rural.
Industrialization  is another  indicator  of development,  but overindustrialization--or  industrial
distortion (INDIST)--was  common  in socialist  countries.  It is defined  here  as the difference  between
the actual  share  of industry  in GDP and  the share  predicted  by the regression  analysis  in Chenery  and
Syrquin  (1989).'1 Industrial  shares  were often  high  because  trade, financial  services,  and business  and
consumer  servicesweretypically  repressed  in socialist  countries.1'  In 1989,  only  Hungary,  Slovenia  and
90ther  historical  and  cultural  factors  can be expected  to affect  a society's  success  in  managing  transition,  but
no attempt  is made  here to capture  these.
'0The  high  share  of industry  in China  (in  contrast  to its low  level  of urbanization)  is partly  due  to extremely  low
prices  in africulture  relative  to industry.
Services  were  suppressed  in communist  countries  partly  for ideological  reasons  that  held  non-material  output
to be "unproductive."  See  Easterly,  de Melo,  and Ofer 1994  for econometric  estimates  of the gap  in actual  and  expected
levels  of services  in Russia  and  other  former  Soviet  states.
8Croatia had service shares of 50 percent of GDP, a typical level for upper middle-income  countries.
Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia  (especially  Slovakia),  Armenia  and Poland had industrial shares of
over 50 percent of GDP; Russia, and countries  in the north-eastem  part of the FSU were close to this
level. In Vietnam  in nid-80s, agriculture  accounted  for a larger, and industry  for a smaller,  GDP share.
Three indicators of resources and growth are considered. The richness of natural resources
(RICH)  differs significantly  among transition countries, as indicated  by the rough characterization  in
Table 1. At first sight, resources make the transition easier  but this may not be so" 2. The resource rich
countries of Central Asia, for example,  have to surmount enormous production and logistical  problems
(pipeline transit rights) before realizing  their oil and gas potential. In some cases, the availability  of
potentially exportable energy resources may permit governments to  delay reform (Azerbaijan, and
Turkmenistan).  On the other hand, for energy  importers,  the break up of the CMEA and the USSR has
entailed  a large terms of trade shock, leading to growing external  indebtedness.
Location (LOCAT), defined  as geographical  proximity  to thriving market economies, may be
especially  important during transition because it facilitates  the import of market institutions and the
adjustment of trade patterns. Moreno and Trehan (1997), for example, show that even in the case of
market  economies,  location  is an important  determiinant  of growth and that this correlation  reflects  more
than common shocks. Countries  from Central  Europe and the Baltics may have benefited  from better
access to Western markets as well as stronger incentives  to adopt the institutional  framework of the
European  Union  because  of prospective  membership. China and Vietnam are close to some of the most
rapidly growing market economies in the world.  At the other end of the spectrum are the remote
12 See Sachs and Warner (1996) for a recent discussion of the effects of natural resources on growth.
9landlocked  countries  from Central  Asia and the Transcaucasus,  with essential  connections  routed
through Russia.  We use a dummy  variable  to indicate  that a particular  country  has a thriving  market
economy  as a neighbor.
Reported  prior  economic  growth  rates  (PRGR)  in CEE  and  FSU during  the second  half  of the
1980s  were mostly  positive,  with  mildly  negative  rates  found  in Romania  and Slovenia.  Growth  tended
to be higher  in the poorer  countries  (Mongolia,  Moldova,  Kyrgyzstan,  and  Turkmenistan,  plus  Vietnam
and China).  This is included  as an initial  condition  because  it has been  observed  that growth  in the
earlier  stages  of  socialist  accumulation  is  higher  and  that  countries  found  themselves  at different  stages  of
this  process  at the beginning  of transition.  The more  mature  countries  were experiencing  stagnation,  if
not declining  growth,  whereas  poorer  countries  were  still  benefiting  from  higher  growth.
Variables  reflecting  initial  economic  distortions  and institutional  characteristics  are shown  in
Table  2. Open  inflation  was chronic  only  in Poland  and  the Yugoslav  Republics  in 1989,  but repressed
inflation  (REPR),  in the form of a monetary  overhang,  was high  in most of CEE  and the FSU. The
indicator  of repressed  inflation  used  in Table  2 is the increase  in deflated  wages  less  the change  in real
GDP from 1987  through  1990;  this suggests  that the strongest  inflationary  pressures  in CEE  were in
Bulgaria,  Romania,  and Poland  and the weakest  were in Czechoslovakia  and Hungary" 3. Repressed
inflation  was highest,  however,  in the FSU, where  upward pressures  on prices  mounted  after 1987,
propelled  by glasnost and diminishing  Union  control  over the Republics.  Macroeconomic  imbalances
were  quite  severe  in Vietnam  in the mid  80s,  but China  began  its reforms  at the end  of the 70s  without  a
13Direct  estimates  of money  overhang  are difficult  to obtain  because  of  difficulty  of estimating  the underlying
voluntary  money  demand  functions.
10monetary overhang.
Reflecting  the desire of authorities  to create a regionally  interdependent  communist  economy,
trade  shares in GDP (TDEP) were high for most CEE and FSU countries and trade flows were
concentrated within the CMEA area.  Compared to the counterfactuals  generated by gravity models
(Winters and Wang 1994),  trade flows  within the area were especially  large for the smaller  republics  of
the USSR, while trade outside the area was very small. The breakdown of the CMEA and the collapse
of the USSR therefore caused tremendous disruption  in the international  trade and payments of these
countries. CEE countries  were less dependent on CMEA trade than FSU countries,  and hence suffered
somewhat less from disruption.  The effects of disruption also depended partly on location; some
countries  could benefit  from cross-border  trade with rich neighbors,  while others were not so fortunate.
China had long left the Soviet orbit, but Vietnam was still  part of the CMEA and felt the effect of its
collapse.
A final  measure of economic  distortion  is the black market exchange rate premium  (BLMKT).
A high black market exchange rate premium is an indicator of expectations of depreciation and/or
foreign  exchange  rationing.  A high differential  between  the official  and the free exchange rate can also be
interpreted as a distortionary  tax on exports and subsidy  on imports (Easterly, 1994). It stimulates  the
diversion of resources from the official  to the informal  sector, a process which is often associated with
consumption of real resources in directly  unproductive activities. Black market premia were especially
high in FSU, Mongolia,  Bulgaria,  Romania,  and Vietnam. They  were relatively  modest in countries  that
had some previous experience  with reforms like Hungary  and the former Yugoslav  republics  of Croatia,
Macedonia,  and Slovenia.  The black market premium  in Czech and Slovak republics  was high according
11to intemational standards, but low compared to the average for transition countries. China  also began
reforms with a relatively  low level of distortions  in its foreign  exchange market.
Table 2 also includes  two variables  reflecting  initial  institutional  characteristics  of the transition
economies. (STATE) is a categorical  variable  differentiating  among countries that were independent
states prior  to 1989 (value of 2); members  of decentralized  states like the former Yugoslav  republics  or
core countries  of centralized  federal states  like the USSR (value of 1); and new nation states (value of
0).  These last needed to build national  institutions  --including  systems of democratic representation,
justice, and security  as well as economic  institutions  such as a central  bank and customs bureau  - while
confronting economic  changes." 4 The non-Baltic  FSU, in particular,  lacked national institutions;  until
recently, these  former Soviet republics were  territories in  a  highly centralized political union,
characterized also by a brain drain from the periphery  to the center. New nation states arising  from the
former  Yugoslavia  and  former Czechoslovakia  were not faced with such serious problems,  as the federal
systems in these countries gave substantial powers and responsibilities  to the constituent republics.
Furthermore,  the historical  ties and the political  affiliation  of CEE countries with Western Europe have
given  them a clear sense of direction  lacked by the new nation states of the FSU.
Another institutional variable,  "market memory"  (MARMEM), captures the lack of familiarity
of the non-Baltic  FSU with market institutions. While this is related  to the STATE variable  discussed
above,  it is likely  that MARMEM has a separate influence  on the reform process, particularly  on the
14Recent cross-country growth studies emphasized the importance of institutional/political  variables. See
Alesina (1997), and Knack and Keefer (1995) for examples.
12ability  of societies  to deal  with  the disequilibria  of the transition."  Not having  a single  generation  in the
society  with prior  experience  of the workings  of market  economy  could  provide  a basis  for adopting  a
wait  and see  approach  to reforms  or for reverting  repeatedly  to old  ways  of doing  things. In fact,  both
types of reform  outcomes  have  been observed  in certain  FSU countries,  and policies  that could  be
regarded  as  "a clean  break  with the past" have  been  more  difficult  to adopt and  the unwillingness  of
some  non-Baltic  FSU countries  to leave  the ruble  zone until  Russia  forced  them  to do so, versus  the
Baltic countries'  decision,  to leave  the ruble  zone quickly  could  partly  reflect  the importance  of prior
experience  with a market  based  system.  If transition  is viewed  as a process  of large  scale  institutional
change, then this variable  could  be very important (Dewatripont  and Roland 1997).16  We use the
number  of years  under  central  planning  as proxy  for this  variable.
11.2 Initial Conditions  Clusters
Initial  condition variables (ICVs)  can be  used  individually in  regression equations, but
interpretation of any  individual  coefficient  is only meaningful  when everything else is held constant.
Moreover, ICVs are often related and they exert their effect jointly, so that the individual  approach
suffers from the omitted variables problem and results estimated coefficients  that are  biased.  An
alternative approach is to include all ICVs in the same equation, but the fact that there are II  of these
variables, some possibly correlated with each other, makes this less useful.  In order to reduce the
dimensionality of the ICVs and to  deal with multicollinearity,  we rely on the method of principal
"While Schultz (1975) uses the concept of the ability  to deal with disequilibria in a market economy  context,
it is also highly  relevant in the transition  context. The ability of transition  economies to reallocate resources toward their
best use and to establish institutions to that end has been a major determinant  of transition pattems.  On this see WDR
(1996).
The  experience of market-based law, for example, was never lost in CEE:WDR 1996.
13components."
For  the  initial  conditions  identified  earlier,  the first  two principal  components  account  for most of
the  variation.  While  it is always  difficult  to interpret  principal  components,  in this  case  they  seem  to have
consistent  interpretations  that  are  robust  to a sensitivity  analysis  whereby  principal  components  have  been
derived  for modified  sets  of initial  conditions.  In all  cases,  the first  two components  explain  between  64
percent and 75 percent  of the variability  of the initial  conditions.  Hence,  in the subsequent  analysis  we
will use only the first two principal  components.  They are presented  in Table  3 and interpreted  as
follows:
PRINM:  The most important  cluster  has high  positive  correlations,  or loadings,  for economic
distortions  (IDEP,  REPR,  BLMKT)  as well  as for  MARMEM.  The weights  for these  variables  given  in
the eigenvector  suggest that PRINI might largely  be interpreted  as an index of the degree of
macroeconomic  distortions  at the beginning  of transition  and a measure  of unfamiliarity  with market
processes.  With liberalization  these distortions  would  translate  into shocks  to the economy  and can
therefore  be viewed  as a measure  of the intensity  of transitory  shocks  when  controlling  for the level  of
liberalization.  Loadings  are somewhat  lower,  for the negatively  signed STATE  and  LOCAT  variables
although  the  corresponding  weights  in the eigenvector  are still  sizeable.  Countries  with  higher  scores  on
trade dependence,  black  market  exchange  premium,  repressed  inflation  and market  memory  and with
lower  values  for STATE,  and  LOCAT  will  tend  to have  higher  values  for PRINI.
PRIN2: The second  most important  cluster  has high  positive  loadings  for per capita  income
7For a thorough description of this technique see Dunteman (1989).
14(INC),  urbanization  (URBAN),  and  over-industrialization  (INDIST) and  might  therefore  be interpreted
as an index  of the overall  level of development,  incorporating  the so-called  "socialist  development
overhang'. For brevity,  we will call  this component  "overindustrialization".  Poor but resource-rich
countries tended  to grow faster prior to transition,  so PRIN2 has also high negative  loadings  for
resources  and  prior  growth  (RICH,  PRGR).  PRIN2  might  therefore  be interpreted  as reflecting  a cluster
of higher  income,  resource  poor  countries  that reached  diminishing  returns  to investment  and  ran out of
steam  before  reforrns  began because  of structural  distortions  reflected  in overindustrialization.  It is, in
fact,  the case that  growth  slowed  noticeably  in the  richer  countries  of CEE  and  the FSU  during  the 60s
and  70s. Labor  force  participation  rates  had  stabilized  at high  levels,  and  rapid  capital  accumulation  was
offset  by declining  capital  productivity. 8 To the extent  that structural  distortions  are  reflected  in PRIN2,
we can  also  view  this  second  component  as a measure  of what the supply  shocks  would  be when  prices
are liberalized  and free entry  allowed. Changes  in the parameters  of the initial  conditions  dominating
PRIN2 can only occur relatively  slowly  so that we can interpret this component as reflecting  persistent
conditions. To sum up, countries  with higher  initial  per capita income,  higher  urbanization,  over-
industrialization,  poor natural  resources  and  low growth  rates  prior to 1989  will  tend to have  higher
values  for PRIN  2.
Given  the nature of the principal  components  procedure,  an important  implication  of these
results  is that macroeconomic  distortions  together  with historical  recollection  of a market economy
tended  to be relatively  uncorrelated  in the pre-transition  period  with  level  of development  and industrial
overhang.  Using  the first  two principal  components  as indices,  we can  group the transition  economies
lsSee  Ofer  1987  and  Easterly  and  Fischer  1994  for  a discussion  of  factors  leading  to the  Soviet  economic
decline.
15along the two dimensions  of macroeconomic  distortions and over-industrialization.  It can be seen in
Figure 1 that the FSU states are uniformly  high on the first dimension,  but differ a great deal on the
second. The Central Asian states were far less developed than the Slavic one, and the Central and
Eastern European countries  tend to cluster in the first quadrant. The Czech and Slovak Republics,  for
example,  have a very high level of structural imbalance, but  low  macroeconomic distortions.
Interestingly, countries like Hungary, Croatia, and Poland--that had a relatively  long history of prior
reforms and more liberal  economic  systems--have  moderately  low values for both macroeconomic  and
structural  distortions. Finally, the  East  Asian economies and  Albania form  a  separate group,
characterized by  a  relatively low  level of  development, and  also by  lesser  structural  and
macroeconomic  distortions.
11.3 Economic  Policies,  Political  Change and Other Factors
An integrated view of transition requires  us to consider  initial conditions  along with other factors,
especially  economic  policies,  political  reforms, and regional  tensions. Economic  policies  are proxied  by
economic  liberalization  indices originally  developed  in de Melo, Denizer, and Gelb (1996a). We use the
annual liberalization  index (LIE) which represents  the level of liberalization  achieved  in each year. Of
course, some countries initiated partial liberalization  within the socialist context prior to transition. In
Poland and Hungary,  reforms were undertaken in 1968 and 1981 respectively,  while Yugoslavia
abandoned formal planning in the  1950s.  But  prior to  1990, other countries in Eastern Europe
(Bulgaria, Romania, former Czechoslovakia)  had departed little from the Soviet model of central
planning and, notwithstanding  the limited initiatives  under perestroika in 1987,  there were no major
16reforms in the USSR prior to 1991. China's  transition started in 1978  from no prior reforms, though in
a mainly rural setting.  In South Vietnam, a small private sector and some market practices were
preserved  after  the  unification  in 1974. The liberalization  index incorporates  the extent of prior reforms in
each country  in its initial  value.
As mentioned earlier, the links between politics and reform are also important. The transition
countries now display  significant  variation  in the degree of political  freedom and civil  liberties  achieved
(see Table  5).  Many  have  made a rapid transition  to democracy,  but in a few countries  political  freedom
has eroded after some progress early in the beginning  of transition. This erosion of political  freedom has
sometimes been related to ethnic, religious  or cultural  tensions deeply rooted in history. We use the
index  of political  freedom (FREEDOM)  by Freedom  House to represent political  change.
Finally, six of the 28 countries covered here have experienced serious regional tensions:  wars,
internal  strife,  or prolonged  war-related  blockades. We use a dummy  variable  RT(regional  tensions) to
capture the disruptive  effects  of these events.
mL.  INITIAL CONDITIONS,  ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION  AND PERFORMANCE
ILi Explaining  the Relationships
We now focus on the links between initial conditions, policy reform choices given by the
liberalization  indices,  and performance  outcomes measured in terms of growth and inflation. We posit
the following  system  of equations;  where "i" represents  country and "t" represents  year:
17LIBI-t=  a + bLIB  it-,  +  b,, PR NI 1 + b2PRJN2i  + b3FREEDOMt + b4RI,±  T  (I+l)
PERFORMANCE,t  = z + yOPRINli  + yMPRJN2i  + Y2  LIBI +yLIB i,  + y4RT i + e (IIL.2)
While  we expect economic  performance  during transition  to depend on initial  conditions,
reforms and special  factors such as war and regional  tensions, previous studies for CEE and the FSU
(De Melo, Denizer,  and Gelb 1996, Selowsky  and Martin, 1997) have found strong evidence  that the
effect of liberalization  is non-linear  over time. In particular,  empirical  results suggest that good
performance  (high growth, low inflation)  depends negatively  on the size  of the contemporaneous
liberalization  step but positively  on the "accumulated  stock" of reforms. We, therefore, expect y2<0
and y3>0. Also, in order to have an overall  positive  effect of liberalization  on perfornance in the
steady state where LIB(t-1) = LIB (t), we would expect jy3j>y2j.  With respect to macroeconornic
distortions  as reflected  in PRINI, we expect their effect on performance  to be negative. PRIN2
captures structural distortions  which were higher in more developed socialist  countries. We therefore
expect yl<O.
What are the implications  of these relationships  for the expected  signs of the coefficients  in the
liberalization  equation?  In the performance  equations,  both contemporaneous  liberalization  and
unfavorable  initial  conditions  are expected  to have a negative  impact on growth and inflation.  A
negative  relationship  between unfavorable  initial  conditions  and degree of liberalization  would
therefore be consistent  with behavior  which attempts  to smooth output during  transition. In these
18countries  slower reforms  would have a smaller  negative  effect on performance  in the short run and in
this way might  be favored  to try to compensate  for the negative  impact  of more unfavorable  initial
conditions.  This logic would suggest a negative  association  between LIB and PRIN1, or bl< 0. Initial
conditions  could also have a direct effect on liberalization  outcomes, due for instance  to lower
effectiveness  of reforms  under more unfavorable  initial  conditions.
It is more difficult  to form expectations  about the sign of b2. To the extent that PRIN2 reflects
structural distortions  and has a negative  impact on growth, we would expect the above reasoning  to
apply  to PRIN2 as well. However, PRIN2 is dominated  by indicators  of level of development,  and it is
not a priori clear how this affects  policy  choices. Level of development,  for example,  tends to be
positively  correlated  with political  freedom,  and as such is likely  to be positively  associated  with
liberalization.  A higher  level of development  may be also associated  with a lower marginal  utility  of
income and therefore with a greater capacity  to absorb  negative shocks;  this could imply  a positive
relationship  between reforms and PRIN2.  And finally,  if administrative  capacity  to implement  reforms
is positively  correlated  with level of development,  and if this capacity  constraint  is binding  during
transition,  then we would also expect to observe a positive  relationship  between  PRIN2 and LIB. All
these hypotheses  therefore suggest a positive  association  between PRIN2 and our liberalization  index.
The hypothesis,  based on empirical  results from previous studies by Selowsky  and Martin
(1997), and de Melo, Denizer  and Gelb (1996) that performance  depends negatively  on the level of
contemporaneous  liberalization  but positively  on the accumulated  stock of reforms, also has
implications  for the effect of past liberalization  on current policy  choices,  in the context of output
smoothing  behavior. Given  this trade-off a higher  level of achieved  liberalization  allows a larger
19contemporaneous  liberalization  step  for a targeted  GDP  growth  rate. We therefore  would  expect
contemporaneous  liberalization  to depend  positively  on the extent  of past  reforms.
As  previously  discussed,  the "window  of  opportunity"  argument  suggests  that  radical  political
change  may  be associated  with  greater  tolerance  on the part of the populace  to economic  hardships  in
the short  run.  Political  change  can therefore  support  more  forward-looking  behavior  which  places
greater  value  on future  benefits  making  it easier  to bear  any  immediate  cost  of liberalization  in
expectation  of its future  benefits.  We therefore,  expect  b3>0.
The above  equations  can  be thought  of as forming  a recursive  system  in which  policy  does
not depend  directly  on current  performance.  The  exclusion  of the performance  variable  from  the
liberalization  equation  is consistent  with  a view  of policy  formation  as a forward  looking  process  in
which  policy  makers  assess  the likely  impact  of initial  conditions  and  policy  on performance  over  time
and decide  on an optimal  reform  path  within  the political  envelope  in a given  country.  However,
simultaneity  between  performance  and  reforms  can still  be an issue  if  the error terms  of the two
equations  are  contemporaneously  correlated.(Kennedy,  1994).  To check  this  we estimated  the system
using  3  SLS  and SUR  methods.  The  results indicate  that  our system  does  not suffer  from  simultaneity.
We  therefore  proceed  under  the assumption  that  the disturbance  terms  of  the two equations  are
uncorrelated  and  use OLS  estimation  procedure  in the analysis.
The assumption  that  disturbance  terrns  are  uncorrelated  implies  that  performance  surprises  do
not  lead  to revision  of reform  plans. This  would  be realistic  if such  surprises  could  be attributed  to
transitory  shocks  or if revision  costs  are  high  due for example  to complexity,  interdependence  of
20different  policy  measures  or credibility  effects  of policy reversals.  One could also question  the very
assumption  of rationality,  which is implicit  in the above  formulation,  in the case of unprecedented
systemic  changes  of this nature. It can be argued, however, that even large mistakes  in estimating  the
effects  of liberalization  and initial  conditions  on perfonnance may not lead to major reassessment  of
reform programs especially  in the direction  of slowing  the process. To use an analogy  between reforms
and investment  decision,  any losses associated  with over-optimism  or over-pessimism  will  be to some
extent of the nature of sunk costs. For example,  an underestimation  of the negative  short-term impact
of liberalization  may cause  a larger than anticipated  decline  in output but it also brings the economy
closer to the point  where, because of large accumulated  stock of refonns, the total impact of
liberalization  on performance  would be positive.  It is therefore conceivable  that mistakes of this nature
may even lead to acceleration  of reforms.
111  2 Empirical  Analysis: Cross Section Equations and Relative Reform Effort
We begin  the empirical  analysis  of the relationships  between initial  conditions,  reforms, and
performance  by looking first at cross-country  variation  using the average values  for the respective
variables  over the five-year  period. The results are presented  in Table 4. In the liberalization  equations
(AVLIB in equations 4.3 and 4.4), we observe a negative  and statistically  significant  association
between liberalization  and our index for initial  macroeconomic  distortions  (PRIN1). This result seems
to indicate  that severe  macroeconomic  distortions  tend to be associated  with slower reforms. The
coefficient  for PRIN2 has a positive sign suggesting  that, on average, more developed countries  tend to
liberalize  more. However, PRIN2 is statistically  significant  only in Eq 4.4, in which political  freedom  is
excluded.  In Eq 4.4, PRIN2 probably  captures some of the effect of democratization  on reforms due to
21the positive  association  between  level  of development  and  political  change  in our sample.  The  level  of
political  freedom  (AVFREE)  has a strong  and  positive  association  with  the degree  of liberalization  as
demonstrated  by the results  for Eq. 4.3.  This  seems  to corroborate  previous  findings  that rapid  and
fundamental  political  change  makes  reform  easier.
Political  change  and  initial  conditions  do not exhaust  the list  of factors  that may  determine  the
policy  choices  of transition  economies.  Individuals,  historical  and  cultural  factors,  external  aid and
demographic  structure  may  also  play  an important  role.  As  the WDR  (1996)  on transition  points  out,
"most  decisive  reforms  have  reflected  the vision  of one  leader  or a small  and  committed  group"
(WDR,  1996,  p. 11).  One  way  to assess  the importance  of such  factors  for individual  countries  is to
look at the  residuals  from  equations  4.3 and  4.4. These  capture  the deviations  of actual  liberalization
from  what  could  be viewed  as a "normal"  level  of liberalization  for a given  set of initial  conditions  and
political  freedoms.' 9 In Table  5 we compare  rankings  of  the transition  economies  under  AVLIB  and
under  the residuals.  Countries  such  as  the Kyrgyz  Republic,  Estonia,  Lithuania,  and  Moldova  have
liberalized  substantially  more  than  expected  given  their  initial  conditions.  On  the other  hand,  countries
such  as  the Czech  and  the Slovak  Republics,  which  started  with  very  good  initial  conditions,  show
negative  values  of the residuals  despite  a high  degree  of liberalization  achieved.  Ukraine,  Romania,
Belarus  and  Turkmenistan  are among  the countries  that have  liberalized  substantially  less  than  expected
for their  set  of initial  conditions.  Countries  that  have  liberalized  under  relatively  lower  levels  of political
freedom  improve  further  their  position  in the  ranking  by the residuals  from  Eq 5.3.  Examples  include
19 It is tempting  to call the residuals indices for the relative reform effort in the spirit of the tax literature, which uses
smimlar  approach to derive measures for tax effort. See for example Lotz and Morss (1969).
22Vietnam,  Uzbekistan,  and Tajikistan.
The results from the performance  equations  (4.1 and 4.2) suggest a negative  association
between PRINM  and PRIN2 and economic  performance.  The effects of PRIN1 on inflation  and growth
are larger and have statistical  significance.  The coefficient  for PRIN2 is not statistically  significant  in
either performance  equations. Regional  tensions are statistically  significant  and important in both the
growth and inflation  equations;  countries  that have suffered  from wars and other disruptions have
experienced  a substantially  lower growth rate (5.6 percent less per annum)  and higher  inflation  than
other countries,  controlling  for initial  conditions  and liberalization.  The coefficients  for AVLJIB  are
negative  and statistically  insignificant.  However, we know from previous  studies that the relationship
between reforms and performance  is highly  non-linear  over time, a feature that cannot  be captured  by
this simple  functional  form and by cross-country  regression  only.
ILL  3 Panel Estimates:  Main Results
As described  earlier,  the panel data set includes  observations  from five  years for each of the 28
countries,  with different  periods for different  subgroups.  We allow a wider set of functional  forms to
exploit  the time dimension  of the data set and to capture potential non-linearities.  As discussed earlier,
previous studies have  found strong empirical  evidence  for a non-linear  relationship  between reforms
and performance. DLTALIB, the first derivative  of the liberalization  index  with respect to time
captures the extent of any "liberalization  shock." To test whether the effectiveness  of policies depends
on initial  conditions  we construct four new variables,  PRiLIB, PR2LIB and DLTPR1 DLTPR2. These
are interaction  terms between LIB and DLTALIB, on the one hand, and PRINI and PRIN2 on the
other.  Fmally,  to look at how the impact  of PRINI and PRIN2 on LIB and performance  varies over
23time, we interact  the two principal  components  with time dummies  using PRINI and PRIN2 in year 1
as a control group. We first estimate  our basic equations  H1.  1 and 11.2 and obtain  the following
results (t ratios are presented in parenthesis  below the coefficients):
(A) LIB= 0.182 + 0.641LIB(-1)  - 0.022PRIN1  + 0.021PRIN2  + 0.015 FREEDOM - 0.026RT
(8.69)  (16.93)  (-2.64)  (2.02)  (4.33)  (-1.15)
R2Adj=0.86,  N obs=140
(B)  LOGINF= 4.80 + 2.5LIB-3.4LIB(-1)  + 0.97PRIN1  + 0.17PRIN2 + 1.69RT
(11.31) (1.86)  (3.05)  (6.89)  (1.08)  (4.56)
R2Adj=0.39, Nobs=140
(C)  GROWTH=-10.41  - 17.54LIB  + 32.6 LIB(-1) -2.95PRIN1 - 3.37PRIN2 - 11.16RT
(-4.37) (-2.31)  (5.19)  (-3.71)  (-3.73)  (-5.34)
R2Adj:=0.43,  N obs=140..
In (A), PRINM  has a negative  and statistically  significant  effect on LIB. The impact of PRIN2
is positive  and also significant  at the conventional.5%  level.  These results are in line with our previous
findings  that macroeconomic  distortions  tend to have a negative, and development  a positive  although
less significant,  impact  on liberalization.  FREEDOM is again positively  associated  with liberalization
and is highly  significant.
The results for the growth and inflation  equations are also in conformity  with the expected
relationships.  Current liberalization  has a negative  impact  on growth and is statistically  highly
significant.  LIB is also positively  associated  with current inflation  although  the coefficient  is
24marginally  insignificant.  As expected,  LIB(-I)  has a strong positive impact on performance  and the
results are highly  significant.  These results therefore seem  to indicate  that performance  depends
positively  on the "accumulated  stock" of reforms even  if negatively  affected  by the size of the
contemporaneous  liberalization  step. The coefficients  for LIB and LIB(-1) imply  that a liberalization
step that more than doubles  the previous period's level of liberalization  is required for the overall
effect on growth to be negative. This is most likely  in the early stage of reforms. Countries  that
started  with some history of reforms may have had more incentives  to liberalize  rapidly  because  the
total effect on performance  is more likely  to be positive.
As before, initial  conditions  have a significant  impact  on performance.  PRINI has a negative
and statistically  significant  effect on growth and inflation.  PRIN2 also preserves its sign from the cross-
sectional  regressions,  but is now also statistically  significant  in the growth equation. RT has a stronger
effect  on growth and inflation  than before since  it now is a year dummy as opposed to a country
dummy  in the cross-sectional  regressions.
To  illustrate  graphically  the implications  of these results for the effects of initial  conditions  on
growth we use the partial derivatives  for GROWTH  with respect  to PRIN1 and PRIN2 in (C) to
construct "isogrowth" lines  for different  sets of initial  conditions  and superimpose  the "isogrowth"
lines  on Fig.  1 to obtain Fig.2. The picture helps with the visualization  of the effect of initial  conditions
on growth. It also clarifies  the importance  of initial  conditions  in explaining  the different  growth
performance  of China  and Vietnam, and to some extent Albania,  compared  to other transition
economies.  China  and Vietnam,  for example, lie on an isogrowth  line which is about 14 % higher  than
25the isogrowth  line for most of the FSU republics. 20
Similar  equations  have also been estimated  excluding  China  and Vietnam. They produce
similarly-sloped  growth lines  and an "out of sample"  growth bonus for China  and Vietnam about 7
percent higher  than for the FSU. This bonus is especially  interesting  in highlighting  the strength  of
observed structural and institutional  features of China and Vietnam,even  when set in a CEE/FSU
context. The difference  of 7 percent between the two estimates  is also instructive  as it may  highlight
the importance  of other factors  that are specific  to East Asian economies.
Table 6 shows the impact of initial  conditions  on policy effectiveness  and the time profile  of the
effect of initial  conditions  on liberalization  and performance  taking  the interaction  terms into account.
Equations 6.2 and 6.4 include  interaction  terms between the policy and the initial  conditions  variables  in
order to test for the effect of initial  conditions  on the effectiveness  of policies.  Interestingly,  we find
that PRILIB and PR2LIB are positively  associated  with performance.  Only  the coefficient  of PR2LIB
in the growth equation is statistically  insignificant.  The results for PRiLIB suggests  that the higher  the
degree of initial  macroeconomic  distortions  the higher  the effectiveness  of reforms in respect to both
growth and inflation.  The coefficient  for PR2LIB in the inflation  equation can be interpreted  as partial
evidence  that the effectiveness  of reforms in curtailing  inflation  is higher  at higher levels  of development
which is associated  with higher  levels  of distortions. With respect to DLTPR1 and DLTPR2, which
capture the effect of initial  conditions  on the size of the liberalization  shock, we expect to observe
20We  also  estimated  a reduced-form  equation  by regressing  growth  on initial  conditions  political  freedom  and
regional  tensions  to capture  the total,  direct  and indirect  (through  liberalization),  effects  of initial  conditions  on growth.
The  results  were similar.
26negative  signs  in the Growth  equation  and positive  signs  in the Inflation  equation.  The  results  in
equations  6.2 and  6.4 do not support  this,  however. The  coefficients  for DLTPR1  and  DLTPR2  in
both  performance  equations  are statistically  insignificant  and  only  the coefficient  for  DLTPR1  in the
growth  equation  has  the "expected"  sign.  We test for robustness  of the results  in equations  6.2 and  6.3
by excluding  China  and  Vietnam  from  the sample.  The  results  continue  to hold  for inflation  and,
although  somewhat  less  strongly,  for growth  as well. Interestingly,  with  this  restricted  sample,  the
coefficient  for  PR2LIB  in the growth  equation  is highly  insignificant  and  now  has a positive  sign.
The  results,  therefore,  do not support  the  hypothesis  that  the effectiveness  of reforms  is
necessarily  lower  under  unfavorable  initial  conditions  as reflected  in  PRIN1  and  PRIN2.  On  the
contrary,  we find  some  evidence  that  the effectiveness  of liberalization  is higher  at higher  levels  of
macroeconomic  and  structural  distortions.  Going  back  to our previous  findings  about  the negative
association  between macroeconomic  and structural  distortions  and  reforms,  this suggests  that  the
negative  association  can  not be explained  by the lower  potency  of reforms  under  unfavorable  initial
conditions.  Unfavorable  initial  conditions  discourage  reforms  but effectiveness  of reforms  is not
reduced  once  they  are implemented.  This  however,  does  not  imply  that steady-state  growth  rate of
countries  with  good and  bad  initial  conditions  will  be similar  with  similar  sets  of policies.  Country
specific  factors,  such  as location  can still  be expected  to play  a role.  For example,  as shown  by Radelet,
Sachs,  and  Lee (1996)  and Sachs  and  Warner  (1996b,c)  countries  that are landlocked  are likely  to have
smaller  long-  run growth  rates  than  countries  with  easy  market  access.
LI14  The  Relative  Importance  of Policies  and  Initial  Conditions
The performance  equations  also  provide  a rough  indication  of  the relative  importance  of initial
27conditions  versus  policies.  By construction,  PRINM  and  PRIN2  have  ranges  and  standard  deviations
that are  three  to four times  larger  than  the  range  for LIB.  With  respect  to the variance  of growth,  the
regression  results  suggest  that  PRINM  and  PRIN2  separately  exert  a smaller  effect  on growth  variance
than  reforms,  but that  their  combined  effect  is comparable  in size  to the effects  of reforms. 2' In the
inflation  equation,  the effect  of PRINI is particularly  strong  and even  dominates  the effects  of
liberalization  policies.
To derive  more  accurate  estimates  of  the explanatory  power  of initial  conditions  relative  to
policies,  special  factors  and  interaction  terms,  we follow  a methodology  developed  by Schmalansee
(1985)  which  uses  the adjusted  R 2 to set  plausible  bounds  for  the variance  explained  by different
groups  of coefficients.  To calculate  these  bounds, we estimate  three  models. The  first  is the full
model,  which  includes  as regressors  contemporaneous  and  lagged  liberalization,  interactive  terms,
initial  conditions,  and  regional  tensions.  The adjusted  R 2shows  the percent  of total  variance  in
performance  explained  by our full  set of regressors.  Next,  we estimate  the model,  restricting  the
coefficients  to zero  for a set  of factors.  By subtracting  the adjusted  P3  from  this  regression  from  the
adjusted  P3  from  the  first  regression,  we compute  a rough  measure  of the total  variation  explained  by
these  factors.  Finally,  we estimate  the model,  restricting  to zero  the coefficients  not in the  given  set.
Its adjusted  P3  provides  a second  crude  measure  of the amount  of total  variation  explained  by the
included  set  of factors.
The results  of this  procedure  are  presented  in Table  7. We  find  that policies  have  the highest
21 This  is based  on the properties  of variances  assuming  the regressors  are independent  random  variables.
28explanatory  power among all sets of factors in the growth equations,  accounting  for 35 to 40 percent
of the variation  in growth that is explained  by the model. Initial  conditions  are also important
contributing  19 to 30 percent of the explained  variance  and PRINI has a higher  explanatory  power
than PRIN2. Interaction  terms play a relatively  less important  role. In the inflation  equation, initial
conditions  dominate  with PRINI being especially  important.  Interaction  terms come second with 22 to
25 percent of the explained  variance  in inflation.
We do the same exercise  for policy as a dependent  variable  and find that political  change  has
the highest  explanatory  power accounting  for 38 to 90 percent of the explained  variance.  PRIN2 may
also be important;  however the range of the estimate  for its explanatory  power is wide.
ms5  The Influence of Initial Conditions over Time
We next explore  the time profile  of the relationships  between initial  conditions,  reforms and
performance.  As described  above,  we interact  the two principal  components  with the year dummies
using the principal  components  in year 1 as control group. Results are presented as equations  6.6, 6.7
and 6.8. With respect to liberalization  (Eq. 6.8), the signs and the magnitudes  of the coefficients
suggest convergence  over time;  less developed  transition  economies  and those with more severe
macroeconomic  distortions  start slowly  but gradually  catch up.  The evidence  for convergence  with
respect to performance  is less conclusive.  PRINI continues  to have a negative  impact  on growth
throughout  the period,  but this impact  is diminishing  over time as the coefficients  exhibit an increasing
trend and tend towards zero. Only  the coefficient  for the interaction  term in year 3 (PR1Y3) is not
statistically  significant.  The signs  of the coefficients  for PRIN2 are also negative  throughout the period
but their magnitudes  do not exhibit  any particular  trend. Also,  none of the coefficients  is statistically
29significant.  The results for the inflation  equation are similar.  Countries  with more severe  initial
macroeconomic  distortions  continue  to suffer  from higher inflation  rates throughout the period,
although  the negative  impact  of PRIN1 is diminishing  over time. The time profile  of the coefficients  for
PRIN2 is less clear and none of the coefficients  is statistically  significant.
As implied  by our model, initial  conditions  have a direct effect on performance  as well as an
indirect  one through their impact on policy  choices.  It is instructive  to compare the two effects and
derive  their evolution  over time. The total effects are calculated  by adding  the direct effect of initial
conditions  on performance  from equations 6.6 and 6.7 and the indirect  contemporaneous  and lagged
effects of initial  conditions  on performance  through their effect on liberalization,  obtained  by
multiplying  the coefficients  for PRINI and PRIN2 from equation 6.8 with the LIB and DLTALIB
coefficients  from Eq.6.6 and 6.7. The results are shown in Table 8 for Growth and Table 9 for
Inflation.  As the results indicate,  adverse  initial  conditions  continue to have a negative,  although
diminishing,  impact  on performance  throughout the period. Second, the direct effects  are stronger in
magnitude  than the indirect  effects  operating through the liberalization  channel  for both PRINI and
PRIN2. A third observation  is that the effects  ofPRIN1 on performance  exhibit  a more pronounced
trend than the effects  of PRIN2.
The results shown in Table 6 can also be  used to decompose  the performance  (growth and
inflation)  and reform paths 22 of transition  economies  into components  reflecting  the influence  of
22The  decompositions  of the  reform  path is based  on the following  equation:  Lib=0.072+0.62Lib(-l)
- O.O9Prinl+0.06Prin2+0.02PR1  Y2+ 0.03PRI Y3+0.05PR1  Y4+ 0.1  OPRlY5-0.02PR2Y2-0.03PR2Y3-
0.07PR2Y4-0.08PR2Y5+0.05 Freedom.
30liberalization  and initial  conditions  over time. We present  results only for growth in Fig.3 using the
average values  for the FSU countries as illustration.  The picture clearly  shows  the positive  and
growing  impact of liberalization  and the diminishing  negative  impact  of DLTALIB on growth.
Convergence  with respect  to PRINI is illustrated  by the decreasing  distance  between the PRIN1 line
and the horizontal  axis. It can also be seen that the positive  effect of liberalization  overtakes  the
negative  impact of DLTALIB in year 2.
The decomposition  of the reform path of transition economies,  again  using average values  for
FSU, is presented  in Fig. 4. At early stages of transition,  a lower level of past liberalization  and higher
initial macroeconomic  distortions limit  the extent of liberalization.  Political  change, however, at this
stage is more dramatic  and largely  drives the policy  choices. Over time, the effect of the accumulated
stock of reforms, as measured  by the lagged liberalization  index,  grows in importance  simultaneously
with a decreasing  negative  influence  of initial  macroeconomic  distortions. The dirminishing  effects of
initial  conditions  over time is shown by the convergence  of PRINI and PRIN2 to the zero line.
Finally,  an interesting  question  is whether these results continue to hold if using the
contemporaneous  sample 1989-96  for all transition  economies.  In essence,  this sample  is unbalanced
with respect to the length of the pre- and post-reform  periods for different  sub-groups of countries.
We find that our main  results are supported by this dataset.
I V. CONCLUSIONS
Casual observation  suggests  that transition countries  fall into three broad groups: the sharply-
recovering countries  of CEE; the slower-adjusting  FSU countries;  and the East Asian countries  which
31responded  to reforms  with  accelerated  growth  rather  than  initial  contraction.  In this  paper  we depart
from  previous  research  that  focussed  on the relationship  between  policy  and  performance  to analyze
the sources  of cross-country  variation  in both reform  policy  choices  and  economic  performance.  A
special  focus  is given  to the role  of initial  conditions,  as well  as to the  role of political  developments.
We also  include  a variable  to represent  regional  tensions  -- noneconomic  events  such  as wars  and
blockades  that  can have  a major  economic  impact.
Countries  may  differ  in many  dimensions,  but  we find  that most  of the variation  across  11
initial  conditions  can  be summed  up in their  first  two principal  components.  The first  can  be
interpreted  as measuring  macroeconomic  imbalance  and  unfamiliarity  with  market  processes  (market
distortions);  the second represents  the level  of socialist  development  and  its associated  structural
distortions  (overindustrialization).  Countries  cluster  into four  broad  groups. Those  in the  FSU all
started  from  deep  market  distortions,  but the Slavic  countries  were  far more  developed  than  those  in
Central  Asia,  and  had  more  serious  structural  distortions.  Countries  in CEE  had  lesser  market
distortions  but, being  relatively  more  developed,  had severe  structural  distortions.  China  and  Vietnam,
and  to a lesser  extent  Albania,  formed  the  final  group  of countries  with  lower  structural  and  market
distortions.
Linkage  between  initial  conditions,  policies  and  performance  is  then  specified  as an equation
system  and  tested  to ensure  recursivity.  Policy  reform,  which  is  represented  by econornic
liberalization,  depends  on initial  conditions,  political  change  and  regional  tensions.  Economic
performance,  measured  in  terms  of growth  and  inflation,  depends  on initial  conditions,  economic
policies  and  regional  tensions. Cross-section  equations  suggest  that  initial  conditions  are indeed
32important,  both for performance  and the speed of economic  liberalization;  also that political  reform, in
particular,  affects  the speed of economic  liberalization.  Belarus and Uzbekistan  offer examples  of
countries  where political  change  and economic  liberalization  proceeded relatively  slowly.
Comparing  actual and predicted  econornic  liberalization  provides a new ranking  of countries.
Mongolia  and the Kyrgyz  Republic,  for example,  reformed  more rapidly  than would have been
expected  given  their initial  conditions;  Bulgaria and Romania reformed  more slowly. The Czech
Republic,  which is normally  thought of as a very rapid reformer,  is only average once its unusually
favorable  initial  conditions  are taken into account.
Moving to estimates  using panel data, regressions  confirm  that adverse  initial  conditions  are
associated  with slower economic  liberalization.  This may be because governments  are reluctant  to
accept upfront costs of sharp reforms on top of the losses  they are experiencing  from the dissolution  of
the old system. Indeed,  very sharp economic  liberalization  is associated  with an output contraction,  but
this is a temporary  phenomenon,  as the effect is speedily  offset by the positive  cumulative  effect of past
liberalization  efforts.  As in other studies,  the relationship  between economic  liberalization  and
performance  is highly  non-linear  over time.
The explanation  that difficult conditions  are associated  with slow reforms  because they
diminish  the effectiveness  of reforms is not supported by the regressions.  Unfavorable  initial  conditions
discourage  reforms but effectiveness  of reforms is not reduced once they are implemented. Moreover,
countries cannot avoid  the costs of non-reform,  especially  if deeply embedded  in a disintegrating
economic  and political  system.  Those fortunate enough to have exports that can be redirected  to
market econornies  -- such as Uzbekistan  with  its gold and wool -- can of course cushion a more
33gradual reform  process more easily  than the others.  Having potential exports on the other hand, such
as natural gas which cannot be exported due to problems  of accessing  pipelines,  may delay  essential
reforms and deteriorate perfornance; Turkmenistan  offers an example.
Regressions  confirm  the adverse  effect of macroeconomic  and structural distortions  on
performance. A typical  country in CEE benefits  over the first five  years by some 5 percent per year
relative  to the Slavic  states of the FSU;  China  and Vietnam  benefit  by some 14 percent per year from
their more favorable  initial  conditions. A possible  objection  to this large estimate is that it includes  a
range of factors  not captured in the initial  conditions  but nevertheless  important  in differentiating  East
Asian  from European experience. An out-of-sample  estimate  of the growth bonus for China  and
Vietnam,  estimated  using the sample  of CEE and FSU countries only, still suggests  a growth bonus of
7% per year. East Asian structural characteristics  have been important, no matter how you look at
them.
Nevertheless,  applying  the procedure due to Schmalensee  (1985) shows that policy  is still  the
most important  factor determining  growth differences  between the 28 countries  in the sample. Initial
conditions  dominate  in the inflation  equation. And political  reform emerges  as the most important
single  determinant  of the speed and comprehensiveness  of economnic  liberalization.
The final  question  addressed in the paper is whether the influence  of the initial  conditions  on
performance  grows or diminishes  in the course of transition. Results suggest that their influence
diminishes,  a conclusion  that might  be surprising  in the light of cross-country  growth regressions  that
show a persistent  impact  of variables  such as location  that are included  in the initial  conditions. Many
of the conditions  woven into the principal  components  are, however, themselves  modified  in the
34course  of transition.  Monetary  overhangs  are  dissipated  through  inflation;  the industrial  overhang  is
eroded  as plants  shut  down,  and  market  memory  returns  through  experience.
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Definition of variables used in the analysis
AVGR - average growth.
LOGAVIN-  log of average  inflation.
AVFREE-  time  average  of the index  of political  freedom  from Freedom  House.
LIB- index of liberalization  developed  in DDG  (1996).
DLTALIB-  the first derivative  of LIB  with  respect  to time.
AVLIB-  time average  of the liberalization  index.
INC-  GDP  at PPP per capita.
BLCMKT-  black  market  exchange  rate  premium.
INDIST-  the difference  between  actual and  predicted  share of industry  in GDP.
LOCAT-  a dummy  variable  with I if a country  has a thriving  market  economy  as a neighbor.
MARMEM-  the number  of years a transition  country  has been  under central  planning.
PRGR-  average  GDP growth  1985-1989.
"REPR-  a measure  of repressed  inflation,  calculated  as the difference  between  growth  of real wages"  and  real GDP growth  over
1987-90.
RICH-  a dummy  variable  that assumes  a value  of I if a country  has economically  important  endowments  of energy  resources.
STATE-  a categorical  variable  with  2 if a country  was an independent  state at the beginning  of reform, I if a country  was a member
of a decentralized  federal  state (Yugoslav  republics)  or was the core state  of a centralized  federal  state  (Russia,  Czech  republic),  0 if
none of the above.
TDEP-  a measure  of trade dependence,  calculated  as the ratio  between  the average  of exports  and imports  and GDP.
URBAN-  share of urban population  in  total population.
PRIN  I- the first principal  component,  which  reflects  the degree  of macroeconomic  distortions.
PRIN2-  the second  principal  component,  which  reflects  the degree  off structural  distortions.
PR LIB- interactive  termn  between  PRIN  I and LIB.
PR2LIB-  interactive  termn  between  PRIN2  and LIB.
PRiYj-  interactive  term between  the principal  components  and year  dummies,  where  i=  1,2  and  j=1-5.
FREEDOM-  index for political  freedom.  Source:  Freedom  House.
RT-  regional  tensions,  a dummy  variable  assuming  value  of I if a country  has experienced  war or blockade  in a particular  year.Table 1: Initial Level of Development, Resources  and Growth
Per cap  Urbanization  Distribution  of GDP  Predicted  Average  Natural  Location
GROUP  COUNTRY  NP at PP  (% of population)  1990 cur prices  Share of  % growth resources
US$ 1989  1990  Industry  Agriculture  Services  Industry  1985-89
Central  Albania  1400  37  0.37  0.26  0.37  0.34  3.6  poor  I
and  Bulgaria  5000  68  0.59  0.11  0.30  0.36  2.7  poor  0
Eastern  Croatia  6171  62  0.35  0.10  0.55  0.34  0.2  poor  I
Europe  Czech Republic  8600  65  0.58  0.07  0.35  0.37  1.6  poor  1
Hungary  6810  62  0.36  0.14  0.50  0.37  1.6  poor  I
FYR Macedonia  3394  59  0.43  0.12  0.45  0.34  0.2  poor  0
Poland  5150  62  0.52  0.13  0.35  0.39  2.8  moderate  I
Romania  3470  53  0.59  0.14  0.27  0.37  -0.8  moderate  0
Slovak  Republic  7600  57  0.59  0.07  0.35  0.36  1.60  poor  I
Slovenia  9200  62  0.44  0.05  0.51  0.39  -0.4  poor  I
Yugoslavia  NA  0.45  0.10  0.45  0.2  poor
Czechoslovakia  NA  0.59  0.07  0.34  1.6  poor
FSU  Armenia  5530  68  0.55  0.11  0.34  0.35  2.7  poor  0
and  Azerbaijan  4620  54  0.44  0.22  0.34  0.36  0.8  rich  0
Mongolia  Belarus  7010  66  0.49  0.22  0.29  0.37  5.2  poor  0
Estonia  8900  72  0.44  0.20  0.36  0.34  2.7  poor  I
Georgia  5590  56  0.43  0.22  0.35  0.35  2.4  moderate  0
Kazakhstan  5130  57  0.34  0.29  0.37  0.38  4.3  rich  0
Kyrgyzstan  3180  38  0.40  0.33  0.27  0.34  5.2  poor  0
Latvia  8590  71  0.45  0.19  0.36  0.35  3.5  poor  I
Lithuania  6430  68  0.45  0.27  0.28  0.35  2.9  poor  I
Moldova  4670  47  0.37  0.32  0.31  0.35  5.7  poor  0
Russia  7720  74  0.48  0.15  0.37  0.41  3.2  rich  I
Tajikistan  3010  32  0.34  0.27  0.39  0.34  1.9  poor  0
Turkmenistan  4230  45  0.34  0.29  0.37  0.35  5.0  rich  0
Ukraine  5680  67  0.44  0.21  0.35  0.40  2.4  moderate  0
Uzbekistan  2740  41  0.33  0.31  0.36  0.37  3.9  moderate  0
USSR  NA  0.44  0.18  0.38  3.8  rich
Mongolia  2100  60  0.41  0.20  0.39  0.40  5.4  moderate  0
East  China*  800  18  0.49  0.24  0.27  0.46  9.0  moderate  I
Asia  Vietnam*  1100  19  0.23  0.41  0.36  0.30  5.0  moderate  I
Notes:  * Statistics for 1978
**  Statistics  for 1986
Predicted share of industry is derived using  the regression results in Syrquin  and H. Chenery (1986)
Source: The World Bank:History  of Planned Economies,
World  Development Report (various issues),  staff estimatesTable 2:Initial Economic Distortions and Institutional Characteristics
Repressed  Black market  Trade  Years under  State
GROUP  COUNTRY  Inflation  premium  dependence  central
1987-90  1990 (°/O)  1990 (% )  planning
Central  Albania  4.3  434  6.6  47  2
and  Bulgaria  18  921  16.1  43  2
Eastern  Croatia  12  27  6.0  46  1
Europe  Czech Republi  -7.1  185  6.0  42  1
Hungary  -7.7  46.7  13.7  42  2
FYR Macedono  12  27  6.0  47  1
Poland  13.6  277  8.4  41  2
Romania  16.8  728  3.7  42  2
Slovak Republi  -7.1  185  6.0  42  0
Slovenia  12  27  4.0  46  1
Yugoslavia  12  27  6.0
Czechoslovakia  -7.1  185  6.0
FSU  Armenia  25.7  1828  25.6  71  0
and  Azerbaijan  25.7  1828  29.8  70  0
Mongoli  Belarus  25.7  1828  41.0  72  0
Estonia  25.7  1828  30.2  51  0
Georgia  25.7  1828  24.8  70  0
Kazakhstan  25.7  1828  20.8  71  0
Kyrgyzstan  25.7  1828  27.7  71  0
Latvia  25.7  1828  36.7  51  0
Lithuania  25.7  1828  40.9  51  0
Moldova  25.7  1828  28.9  51  0
Russia  25.7  1828  11.1  74  1
Tajikistan  25.7  1828  31.0  71  0
Turkmenistan  25.7  1828  33.0  71  0
Ukraine  25.7  1828  23.8  74  0
Uzbekistan  25.7  1828  25.5  71  0
USSR  25.7  1828
Mongolia  7.6  1400  31.0  70  2
East  China*  2.3  208  1.0  46  2
Asia  VietNam*  15  464  7.2  21**  2
Notes: Repressed inflation is calculated as percent change in real wage less the percent change
in real GDP over 1987-90.
* The numbers for China and Viet Nam are for the period before 1978 and 1986
respectively.
**  Average for North and South Vietnam
Trade dependence is defined as the ratio between  the average of exports and imports
and GDP.
Source: The World Bank, Syrquin and Chenery (1989), Tarr ( 1993).Table 3: Results from the Principal  Component  Analysis
Variation  Eigenvectors  Correlations*
Component  Proportion  Cumulative  Variable  PRIN I  PRIN2  Variable  PRIN I  PRIN2
PRINI  0.39  0.39  INC  -0.03  0.50  INC  -0.06 (0.78)  0.86 (0.00)
PRIN2  0.28  0.67  STATE  -0.36  -0.21  STATE  -0.75 (0.00)  -0.37 (0.06)
PRIN3  0.09  0.76  PRGR  0.16  j  -0.35  PRGR  0.33  (0.09)  -0.61 (0.00)
PRIN4  0.07  0.83  RICH  0.12  j  -.  RICH  0.24 (0.21)  -0.62 (0.00)
PRINS  0.06  0.89  TDEP  0.40  0.14  TDEP  0.84 (0.00)  0.24 (0.21)
PRIN6  0.03  0.92  BLCMKT  0.46  0.06  BLCMKT  0.96 (0.00)  0.10 (0.61)
PRIN7  0.04  0.96  INDIST  -0.12  0.39  INDIST  -0.26 (0.18)  0.68 (0.00)
PRIN8  0.02  0.98  URBAN  0.00  0.52  URBAN  0.001  (0.99)  0.90 (0.00)
PRIN9  0.01  0.99  LOCAT  -0.32  0.05  LOCAT  -0.66 (0.00)  0.08 (0.68)
PRINI 0  0.01  1.00  MARME  -0.42  0.01  MARMEM  0.87 (0.00)  -0.01(0.94)
PRIN I 1  0.00  1.00  REPR  0.41  0.03  REPR  0.86 (0.00)  0.05 (0.80)
Note: * P-values  in parenthesisTable 4: Partial Associations Between  Performance,
Liberalization and Initial Conditions
(Based on Cross-country Regressions)
Dependent Variable
LOGAVIN  AVGR  AVLIB  AVLIB
Eq 4.1  Eq 4.2  Eq 4.3  Eq 4.4
INT  4.64  -4.43  0.29  0.54
PRINI  1.18  -4.03  -0.05  -0.07
464  -2.54
PRIN2  0.04  -1.25  0.03  0.13
AVLIB  1.23  -3.44
AVFREE  0.04
RT  1.42  -5.66
a18  -306
Adj R2  0.644  0.602  0.7003  0.55
N obs  28  28  28  28
Note:  t-ratios below coefficientsTable 5: Ranking  of Transition  Economies  by AVLIB  and Residuals  from Eq 5.3 and 5.4
Country  AVLIB  AVFREE  PRINI  PRIN2  Residuals  Residuals  Rank by  Rank by Resid  Rank by Resid
from Eq 4.3  from Eq 4.4  AVLIB  from Eq 4.4  from Eq 4.3
Albania  0.46  4.4  -1.12  -1.15  -0.050  -0.019  17  16  18
Armenia  0.50  6.8  0.79  0.94  -0.082  -0.096  15  22  23
Azerbaijan  0.38  3.2  1.00  -0.03  -0.006  -0.083  22  19  15
Belarus  0.37  5.8  1.19  0.73  -0.139  -0.168  23  26  26
Bulgaria  0.55  7  -0.55  0.56  -0.098  -0.099  14  23  25
China  0.12  0  -1.00  -2.62  -0.147  -0.166  28  25  27
Croatia  0.71  4.8  -1.07  0.32  0.127  0.047  8  12  4
Czech  Republic  0.72  8.6  -1.43  1.20  -0.065  -0.077  6  17  21
Estonia  0.84  8.2  0.33  1.24  0.159  0.170  1  3  1
Georgia  0.44  4.6  0.84  0.41  -0.028  -0.088  20  20  16
Hungary  0.75  9.6  -1.47  0.08  -0.056  0.088  4  8  19
Kazakstan  0.48  4.4  1.07  -0.62  0.066  0.100  16  7  8
Kyrgyz  Republi  0.67  6.8  1.03  -0.53  0.140  0.270  11  1  2
Latvia  0.72  8  0.46  1.15  0.058  0.073  7  11  11
Lithuania  0.79  9.6  0.52  0.91  0.062  0.171  2  2  10
FYR Macedonia  0.70  5.6  -0.80  0.09  0.102  0.084  9  9  6
Moldova  0.56  5.2  0.80  -0.32  0.091  0.125  13  5  7
Mongolia  0.45  6.6  0.29  -0.68  -0.095  0.022  19  14  24
Poland  0.78  9.4  -1.18  0.15  -0.004  0.129  3  4  14
Romania  0.46  3.8  -0.94  0.29  -0.059  -0.188  18  27  20
Russia  0.63  6.8  0.34  0.28  0.038  0.077  12  10  12
Slovak  Repuibli  0.69  7.8  -1.25  1.12  -0.043  -0.080  10  18  17
Slovenia  0.75  5.4  -1.24  0.83  0.111  0.006  5  15  5
Tajikistan  0.31  1.8  1.01  -0.49  0.005  -0.090  26  21  13
Turkmenistan  0.20  1.4  1.27  -0.87  -0.067  -0.138  27  24  22
Ukraine  0.34  6.8  0.91  0.53  -0.226  -0.197  24  28  28
Uzbekistan  0.41  1.6  1.15  -1.15  0.140  0.102  21  6  3
Vietnam  0.34  0  -0.92  -2.38  0.063  0.024  25  13  9
Source:  Freedom  House  (various issues)  autbors  estimates.Table 6: Estimates  of the Performance and Liberalization Equations
Depedent Variable
Growth  Growth  Loginf  Loginf  Lib  Growth  Loginf  Lib
Eq6.1  Eq6.2  Eq6.3  Eq6.4  Eq6.5  Eq6.6  Eq6.7  Eq6.8
INT  -10.41  -11.02  4.80  5.05  0.30  -11.19  4.72  6.27
-437  455  11.31  12.98  9.19  -4.59  10.79  7.50
LIB  15.06  16.40  -0.90  -1.29  15.80  -0.81
3.96  4.35  -1.33  -2.12  4.13  -1.18
DLTALIB  -32.60  -35.79  3.40  3.52  -31.10  3.91
-5.19  -5.13  3.05  3.15  -4.70  3.28
PRINI  -2.95  -6.11  0.98  2.42  -0.05  -6.90  1.16  -0.10
-3.71  -2.90  6.89  7.14  -3.74  -4.11  3.84  -2.95
PRIN2  -3.37  -4.40  0.17  0.06  0.04  -5.10  0.39  0.06
-3.73  -2.59  1.08  245  1.96  -2.97  1.27  1.86
PRILIB  8.15  -2.65
2.43  -4.92
PR2LIB  3.06  -1.11
0.99  -2.23
DLTPRI  -9.30  -1.26
-1.27  -1.07
DLTPR2  0.73  -1.71
0.10  -1.45
PR1Y2  4.88  0.24  0.02
2.03  0.55  0.so
PR1Y3  3.24  0.01  0.03
1.36  0.02  0.70
PR1Y4  5.98  -0.57  0.06
2.51  -1.32  1.37
PR1Y5  6.00  -0.58  0.11
2.52  -1.36  2.22
PR2Y2  1.49  -0.41  -0.02
0.63  -0.98  -0.52
PR2Y3  2.88  -0.21  -0.04
1.21  -0.49  -0.83
PR2Y4  1.52  -0.17  -0.06
0.64  -0.40  -1.25
PR2Y5  2.37  -0.41  -0.07
0.99  -0.95  -1.43
RT  -11.16  -9.41  1.69  1.14  -10.03  1.59
-5.34  -4.41  4.56  3.33  -4.74  4.18
FREEDOM  0.04  0.05
&00  8.25
Adj  R2  0.429  0.452  0.393  0.522  0.551  0.439  0.429  0.552
Nobs  140  140  140  140  140  140  140  140
Note: T-ratios  appear below  the  coefficientsTable  7: Estimates  of the Explanatory  Power  of Policy,  Initial Conditions  and  Political  Frecdom
Measure of Explanatory Power  Policy  Interactions  Initial Conds  RT  Prinl  Prin2  All variables
for Sets of Independent Variables  max  min  max  min  max  min  max  min  max  min  max  min  max=min
Growth
Percent of total variance
explained  by set  18.1  15.8  8.9  2.3  13.6  8.7  12.2  7.8  11.6  3.1  2.4  1.9  45.2
Percent of explained  variance
explained by set  40.0  35.0  19.7  5.1  30.1  19.2  27.0  17.3  25.7  6.9  5.3  4.2  100.0
Inflation
Percent of total variance  6.3  4.5  12.9  11.7  27.4  26.8  9.8  3.9  27  18.2  1.7  0  52.2
explained by set
Percent of explained  variance
explained by set  12.1  8.6  24.7  22.4  52.5  51.3  18.8  7.5  51.7  34.9  3.3  0.0  100.0
Policy  Pol Freedom  Initial Conds  Prinl  Prin2  Total
max  min  max  min  max  min  max  min
Percent of total variance
explained by set  50.3  20.7  34.4  4.8  7.4  4.3  26.8  1  55.1
Percent of explained  variance
explained by set  91.3  37.6  62.4  8.7  13.4  7.8  48.6  1.8  100.0Table 8: Summary of Estimated Direct and Indirect Effects
of Initial Conditions on Growth
Relevant  PRINM
Parameters
year  Direct  effect on  Through  Through  Total  Comment
Growth  Liberalization  Liberalization
lagged  contemp
I  a4+b2*a2  -6.90  -2.95  1.45  -8.40
2  (a4+a6)+(b2+b4)*a2  -2.05  -2.24  1.10  -3.19  b4 not significant
3  (a4+a7)+(b2+b5)*a2  -3.69  -1.96  0.96  -4.69  a7, b5 not significant
4  (a4+a8)+(b2+b6)*a2  -0.95  -1.00  0.49  -1.46  b6 not significant
5  (a4+a9)+(b2+b7)*a2  -0.94  0.31  -0.15  -0.78
PRIN2
I  a5+b2*a2  -5.10  1.83  -0.90  -4.16
2  (a5+alO)+(b3+b8)*a2  -3.61  1.09  -0.54  -3.06  alO, b8 not significant
3  (a5+al 1)+(b3+b9)*a2  -2.22  0.65  -0.32  -1.89  al 1, b9 not significant
4  (a5+al2)+(b3+blO)*a2  -3.58  0.06  -0.03  -3.55  a12, blO not significant
5  (a5+al3)+(b3+bll)*a2  -2.73  -0.19  0.09  -2.83  al3, blInot significant
Notes. The estimated  a's are taken from regression  6.6
The estimated  b's are taken from regression  6.8Table 9: Summary of Estimated Direct and Indirect Effects
of Initial Conditions on Inflation
Relevant  PRINM  Comment
Parameters
-year  . Direct effect on  Through  Through  Total
Inflation  Liberalization Liberalization
lagged  contemp
I  a4+b2*a2  1.160  0.371  -0.295  1.237  a2 not significant
2  (a4+a6)+(b2+b4)*a2  1.400  0.282  -0.223  1.458  a2,a6,b4  not significant
3  (a4+a7)+(b2+bS)*a2  1.170  0.246  -0.195  1.221  a2,a7,b5  not significant
4  (a4+a8)+(b2+b6)*a2  0.590  0.125  -0.099  0.616  a2,a8,b6  not significant
5  (a4+a9)+(b2+b7)*a2  0.580  -0.039  0.031  0.572  a2,a9 not significant
PRIN2
1  a5+b3*a2  0.390  -0.231  -0.048  0.342  coefficients  not significant
2  (a5+alO)+(b3+b8)*a2  -0.090  -0.137  -0.028  -0.118  coefficients  not significant
3  (a5+al 1)+(b3+b9)*a2  0.180  -0.082  -0.017  0.163  coefficients  not significant
4  (a5+al2)+(b3+blO)*a2  0.220  -0.008  -0.002  0.218  coefficients  not significant
5  (a5+al3)+(b3+bl  I)*a2  -0.020  0.023  0.005  -0.015  coefficients  not significant
Notes.  The  estimated  a's are taken from regression  6.8
The estimated  b's are taken from regression  6.7Figure  1. Ranking  of Transition  Economies by the First  Two Principal  Components
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Note: PRIN  I  -macroeconomic  distortions  and unfamiliarity  with  market  process;
PRIN2-  level  of development  and overindustrialization.Figure  2. Isogrowth  Lines for Sets of Initial  Conditions
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